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The  National  Knowledge  Commission  of  India  (NKC)  recommended a  new  legal 
framework along the  lines of the  US  Bayh-Dole Act of  1980, for  ownership  and 
licensing of patents on outputs of public-funded research. It is to this effect that a 
proposed  legislation  called  The  Protection  and  Utilisation  of  Publicly  Funded 
Intellectual Property Bill 2008 has been tabled in the Indian parliament. 
 
This paper by Prof. Amit Shovon Ray and Mr. Sabyasachi Saha is a comprehensive 
and critical review of the patenting and licensing experience of US universities after 
the  Bayh-Dole  Act  was  passed.  They  also  highlight  some  of  the  other  country 
evidence  with  regard  to  similar  legislations.  Against  the  backdrop  of  the  US 
experience post Bayh-Dole, the paper attempts to draw concrete lessons for public-
funded  research  in  India  to  enrich  and  inform  policy  debate  in  the  wake  of  the 
proposed Indian version of the Bayh-Dole bill. The authors argue that the expected 
impact of similar legislation in India will depend on the overall context and the nature 
and culture of public-funded research in India. The implications, some of which are 
brought  out  in  this  paper  could  be  usefully  taken  into  account  before  the  Indian 
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The  question  of  protecting  intellectual  property  rights  by  academic  inventors  was 
never seriously contemplated until the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 in 
the US. The Act allowed universities to retain patent rights over inventions arising out 
of  federally-funded  research  and  to  license  those  patents  exclusively  or  non-
exclusively  at  their  discretion.  This  particular  legislation  was  a  response  to  the 
growing concern over the fact that federally funded inventions in the US were not 
reaching  the  market  place.  In  this  paper,  we  present  a  critical  review  of  the  US 
experience after the Bayh-Dole Act and argue that the evidence is far from being 
unambiguous. We discuss the debate surrounding the Act – the extent to which it was 
successful in achieving its objectives, the unintended consequences, if any, and more 
generally,  the  effectiveness  of  IPR  as  a  vehicle  of  technology  transfer  from 
universities. We also  discuss  the  limited  evidence  on  Bayh-Dole  type  legislations 
introduced in other countries. A new legislation, along the lines of the US Bayh-Dole 
Act – The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded IP Bill, 2008 – is presently 
before the Indian parliament. The paper presents an Indian perspective against the 
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Patenting Public-Funded Research for Technology Transfer: 
A Conceptual-Empirical Synthesis of US Evidence with Lessons for India 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Public-funded research is expected to play a key role in ushering in innovations for 
competitiveness  and  economic  growth,  and  influence  a  country’s  technology 
trajectory. In the USA, public-funded research has always been an integral part of the 
national  economic  strategy.  Many  US  innovations,  especially  in  the  areas  of 
pharmaceuticals and computer systems, had their origins in federally funded research 
conducted  at  universities  and  laboratories.  However,  traditionally,  the  outputs  of 
academic research have always been placed freely in the public domain – to be picked 
up either by fellow and future researchers for further pursuit of knowledge or by 
entrepreneurs for industrial or commercial application of the received wisdom. The 
question of protecting private ownership of intellectual property rights by academic 
inventors was never seriously contemplated. 
 
The USA, the leading global economic power of the previous century, had reached 
the  highest  standards  (in  both  quality  and  quantity)  of  academic  research,  largely 
funded by public resources, by the decades of the 1960s and the 1970s. This had 
potentially  enormous spillover effects on the  industrial and strategic  technological 
capability  of  the  nation.  However,  beginning  from  the  1970s,  there  was  growing 
concern about the apparent decline in the social value of public research in the US as 
policy makers began to realise that innovations resulting from public-funded research 
were not reaching the market place (Mowery, 2005). 
 
This pessimism prompted US lawmakers to seek institutional intervention in the form 
of new legislations to promote industrial application, coupled with a smooth transfer 
of technologies generated from publicly funded research. It was with this vision that 
two consecutive legislations were passed in the US in the year 1980. The first statute, 
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, made technology transfer an 
integral part of the research and development responsibilities of federal laboratories 
and their employees (Eisenberg 1996). The second statute was the University and 
Small Business Patent Procedures Act (1980), commonly known as the Bayh-Dole 2 
 
Act, which got its name from the two sponsors of the Bill – senators Birch Bayh of 
Indiana  and  Robert  Dole  of  Kansas.  The  Bayh-Dole  Act  rationalised  the  patent 
ownership provisions for outputs of public-funded research, allowing universities and 
not-for-profit agencies to retain patent titles for all inventions arising out of research 
sponsored by federal agencies. They were also given the statutory authority to license 
these patents to industry on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis. 
 
This marked the beginning of a new strand of literature in economics, often with a 
multidisciplinary perspective, on academic research and IPR. This paper attempts to 
present a critical review of this rich and focused literature. Although, the major bulk 
of  this  literature  pertains  to  the  US  experience,  especially  the  consequences  and 
implications of the Bayh-Dole Act for public-funded research and technology transfer 
in the US, there is also evidence from other countries (developed as well as emerging) 
that have experimented with this type of legislation over the past decade and a half. 
 
Even in India, a new bill (The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual 
Property Bill 2008), inspired by the US Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, has been introduced 
in Parliament to stimulate public-funded research for greater industrial application. It 
is often contended that even though Indian universities and research institutes have 
been quite active in their research pursuits, their interface with industry has remained 
sub-optimal. The proposed bill seeks to encourage disclosure and patenting of the 
results of public-funded research by universities and institutes and uphold their right 
to license these patents, either exclusively or non-exclusively, in order to incentivise 
industry to come forward and pick up inventions from government-funded institutes 
for commercial development. The National Knowledge Commission of India has been 
candid in stating that such legislation would benefit all stakeholders – the university 
(generating  royalty  revenues  as  incentives  for  research,  patenting  and  licensing), 
industry (getting to know about university innovations and to invest in downstream 
R&D for their commercial application) and the public (enjoying the fruits of public-
funded research through commercial applications). 
 
There is now a large body of empirical literature on the impact of Bayh-Dole on 
university research and technology transfer in the US. The evidence is far from being 
unambiguous. It is in this context that we intend to present a conceptual-empirical 3 
 
synthesis of this literature, especially from the US evidence after the Bayh-Dole Act, 
to draw policy lessons for India. 
 
In section II, we review this US-based literature with a view to exploring the genesis, 
rationale and consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act. We discuss the various intended as 
well as unintended consequences of this legislative intervention as reported in the 
literature,  covering  a  whole  range  of  issues,  including  the  nature  and  culture  of 
research, incentives for research and disclosure-patenting-licensing. In section III, we 
present the US experience with university-industry interface and technology transfer 
from public-funded research. Following the US experience, several other countries, 
both OECD and emerging economies, introduced similar legislative interventions for 
protecting IPR on academic research. In section IV, we present a brief overview of the 
limited amount of literature on these, other country experiences. Section V highlights 
the core debate regarding patenting of academic research as reflected in the varied 
literature reviewed in earlier sections. In Section VI, we present a broad overview of 
public-funded research in India in order to derive policy lessons from the US Bayh-
Dole experience. Finally, section VII highlights the some of the key conclusions. 
 
II.  The Bayh-Dole Act: Genesis, Rationale and Consequences 
 
II.1  Run up to the Bayh-Dole Act: A Historical Perspective 
 
The introduction of the US Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 has an interesting genesis. The US 
research  culture,  which  pioneered  the  advancement  of  the  global  frontiers  of 
technology during much of the last century, was seen to be developing some intrinsic 
mismatches.  There  was  lack  of  clarity  regarding  patent  ownership  of  innovations 
arising  out  of  academic  research,  which  had  even  partial  federal  funding.  This 
distanced industry from any public-funded academic research in the majority of areas 
(Etzkowitz  and  Stevens,  1998),  biomedical  research,  perhaps,  being  a  notable 
exception (Cohen et al, 2002). 
 
US universities have been patenting faculty inventions since as early as the 1920s, 
although  prior  to  the  early  1940s,  few  institutions  had  developed  formal  patent 
policies  and  most  of  them  seemed  ambivalent  toward  patenting  (Mowery  2005). 4 
 
Interestingly, many of the universities did not manage patenting activities themselves, 
mainly to avoid the political consequences of conveying the impression of profiting 
from  faculty  inventions  or  to  avoid  losing  their  non-profit  tax  status.  Many 
universities, especially public-funded ones, engaged in patenting of faculty research 
through the establishment of affiliated, but legally separate, entities like a research 
foundation. Others engaged third party specialists like the Research Corporation – 
founded way back in 1912 by Frederick Cottrell – a faculty inventor at the University 
of California, to manage their patenting and licensing activities (Mowery and Sampat, 
2004).  Columbia  University’s  policy  maintained  that  while  patenting  is  the 
responsibility of the inventor, patent administration is best carried out by the Research 
Corporation,  as  “it  is  not  deemed  within  the  sphere  of  the  university’s  scholarly 
activities”. Similar stances were adopted by Harvard, Chicago, Yale, Johns Hopkins 
etc. Universities like Ohio State and Pennsylvania discouraged or prohibited medical 
patents. 
 
During the early post-war period in the US, only non-exclusive licenses could be 
obtained to exploit the results of academic research results by industry. By engaging 
more than one company to practise a given invention through non-exclusive licenses, 
the system encouraged competition to keep prices “reasonable”. In the pre-Bayh-Dole 
era, patenting and licensing of university research was centrally managed by an entity 
called the National Technical and Information Service (NTIS), under the aegis of the 
Department  of  Commerce.  This  arrangement,  however,  had  serious  limitations. 
Although  it  was  effective  for  fields  such  as  mechanical  devices,  electronics  and 
chemical processes that were characterised by short product development durations 
and  reasonably  low  risks,  it  was  completely  ineffective  for  fields  like 
pharmaceuticals,  which  have  longer  development  timeframes.
1  Indeed,  a  study 
conducted by the federal government in 1968 found that no government-owned patent 
in pharmaceuticals was ever developed for commercial use. 
 
This ambivalence towards university patenting started changing in the 1960s and the 
pace  of  change  accelerated  later  during  the  1970s  in  response  to  greater  federal 
                                                 
1 Moreover, this system posed procedural hurdles for seeking inventor collaboration during commercial 
development  due  to  a  fundamental  disconnect  between  the  inventor  (at  the  university)  and  the 
licensing authority (at NTIS). 5 
 
initiatives  in  R&D  funding.  In  fact,  institutional  patent  management  agreements 
(IPAs),  first  implemented  by  the  Department  of  Health,  Education  and  Welfare 
(HEW) and later by the National Science Foundation (NSF), may be considered a first 
response  towards  resolving  this  long-standing  institutional  bottleneck.  The  IPAs 
allowed  institutions  to  negotiate  title  rights  to  inventions  arising  out  of  federally 
funded research. 
 
According  to  Etzkowitz  and  Stevens  (1998),  these  agreements  between  individual 
government research funding agencies and universities contributed to the growth of 
university patenting during the 1970s. Many universities started creating their own 
technology transfer offices (TTOs). Moreover, this period also witnessed the maturing 
of fields like biomedical research with patentable outcomes for industrial application. 
This  also  acted  as  a  significant  factor  promoting  university  patenting.  However, 
according to a Senate Judiciary Committee in 1978, the government owned the title to 
more than 28,000 patents but licensed fewer than four per cent of them. In fact, the 
IPAs did not provide an adequate institutional framework for encouraging patenting 
and licensing of university research for commercial development. 
 
In  1978,  Purdue  University’s  attempt  to  negotiate  an  IPA  to  commercialise  a 
promising medical device technology was scuttled by HEW (Etzkowitz and Stevens, 
1998). Birch Bayh, the Democrat senator took up the issue. The cause was equally 
patronised by the Republican senator, Robert Dole. Bayh and Dole jointly initiated the 
enactment of a legislation to correct these weaknesses. Meanwhile, the Department of 
Commerce,  seriously  concerned  about  the  United  States’  declining  international 
competitiveness,  was  earnestly  looking  for  ways  to  bridge  the  divide  between 
academic research and industrial R&D. Some universities like Wisconsin University 
and Stanford University also joined the lead with Purdue, supporting this initiative for 
bringing  a  change  in  the  existing  institutional  set-up  that  required  a  complex 
arrangement  of  individual  IPAs.  The  period  coincided  with  academic  research 
witnessing  a number of  breakthroughs  in  the  biomedical and biotechnology fields 
with promises of successful commercial development by industry. It was, therefore, in 
1979 that serious efforts were made to formalise the so-called Bayh-Dole Bill – “the 6 
 
most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half century” 
according to The Economist.
2 
 
II.2  Rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act 
 
University ownership of patent titles on inventions generated out of public-funded 
research under the statutory provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act 1980 was supposed to 
facilitate patenting and licensing of university research in the US. The passage of the 
Bayh-Dole Act was part of a broader shift in US policy towards a stronger intellectual 
property rights regime (Mowery and Sampat, 2004). This law was seen to be the 
much-needed instrument that would ensure the best development and application of 
university generated research results. 
 
According to Eisenberg (1996), the earlier institutional framework in this regard in 
the US, had typically encouraged or mandated federal agencies sponsoring research to 
make the results widely available to the public through publications made available in 
the  public  domain  or  through  government  ownership  of  patent  titles  for  non-
exclusively licensing to multiple industry players. However, this same public domain 
was perceived by many to be a treacherous sand pit, engulfing many potential seed 
ideas and inventions generated in universities that might otherwise have been put to 
actual  application.  Firms,  in  many  cases,  did  not  even  get  to  know  about  the 
inventions taking place at universities and, even if they did, they were not willing to 
pick up these inventions in their nascent stage without exclusive patent license. The 
Bayh-Dole Act 1980 was intended to reverse this unfavourable trend in the US by 
allowing universities to own patent titles on outputs of public-funded research and 
license them exclusively at their discretion. 
 
Traditionally, patents are understood to facilitate a market for technology exchange 
through licensing and other agreements that permit the use of the technology (Gallini 
2002). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was principally meant to incentivise industry to 
come forward,  pick  up  university  research  results  and  explore  the  possibilities  of 
further  development  into  marketable  products.  The  incentive  scheme  was  legally 
                                                 
2 “Innovation's Golden Goose”, The Economist, 12 Dec 2002. 7 
 
routed  through  the  assurance  of  exclusive  licensing  on  all  patented  inventions 
generated out of public-funded research at universities. It was argued that without this 
assurance,  firms  could  not  afford  to  take  the  risk  of  committing  enormous 
expenditures needed to develop university innovation that was often embryonic for 
commercial  application.
3.In  fact,  it  was  particularly  emphasised  that 
commercialisation  of  university  inventions  was  neither  the  function  nor  the 
responsibility  of  the  university  and,  therefore,  industry  participation  was  essential 
(Stevens, 2004). It was argued that stronger and well-defined intellectual property 
rights  for  university  research  would  accelerate  their  commercial  exploitation. 
(Mowery et al, 2001). 
 
It is not very clear from the literature whether policy makers were also thinking of 
directly incentivising university research itself through the Bayh-Dole enactment. But 
the rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act, in popular parlance, is often interpreted as a 
financial incentive to university researchers not only to stimulate quality research, but 
also to disclose and patent ‘profitable’ discoveries for commercial use and consider it 
as a new source of income (Coupe 2003). According to Mowery and Sampat (2005), 
the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  the  Bayh-Dole  legislation  suggest  that  it  is  the 
ultimate expression of faith in the “linear model” of innovation a la Bush (1945) – if 
basic  research  results  can  be  purchased  by  would-be  developers,  commercial 
innovation will be accelerated. 
 
II.3  Consequences: Trends in Patenting and Licensing Post-Bayh-Dole 
 
The surge in university patenting in the US in the last couple of decades has spurred 
research into its cause and effect. The cause may be linked to changes in the research 
environment resulting from the new IPR framework established by the Bayh-Dole Act 
1980. The effects are evaluated in terms of commercialisation of university/laboratory 
generated,  embryonic  inventions  and  research  tools  along  with  unintended 
consequences for university research profile and culture, if any. At the outset, we 
present some of the findings sketching the overall trends in the profile of university 
patenting in the US, both before and after the Bayh-Dole Act. 
                                                 
3 This was highlighted by Birch Bayh in his Senate speech to introduce the Bill on 13 September 1978 8 
 
There has been a phenomenal expansion of university patenting in the US over the 
last three decades of the last century. Comparing the rates of growth of university 
patents vis-à-vis total US patents (domestic and  overall)  between  1965 and 1988, 
Henderson  et  al  (1998)  observed  that  university  patents  grew  more  rapidly  than 
overall US patents and much more rapidly than US domestic patents. Mowery (2005) 
reports that the share of university patents in total US patents with domestic assignees, 
increased from less than 0.5 per cent in 1970 to nearly 4 per cent by 1999, and the rate 
of growth of this share began to accelerate just before 1980. 
 
This process was facilitated  by new  organisational structures  whereby universities 
assumed a more prominent role in managing their patenting and licensing activities 
through the establishment of technology transfer offices (TTO). The number of TTOs 
increased from 25 in 1980 to 200 in 1990 and, by the end of 1990s, TTOs became an 
integral part of virtually all US universities (Nelson 2001). According to Henderson et 
al (1998), there has been a significant increase in the number of universities taking out 
patents – from 30 in 1965 to nearly 150 in 1991. However, the study reports that 
university  patenting  remained  highly  concentrated  with  the  top  20  institutions 
accounting for 70 per cent of the total number of patents. MIT, the most prolifically 
patenting institution, alone commands about eight per cent of the total. 
 
Interestingly,  the  surge  in  university  patenting  has  been  largely  limited  to  a  few 
specific  fields.  According  to  Henderson  et  al  (1998),  between  1965  and  1988, 
universities  are  seen  to  be  more  inclined  towards  patenting  drug  and  medical 
technologies and less towards patenting mechanical technologies. Fields like chemical 
and electronic technologies were in between in this regard. The study by Mowery et al 
(2001) shows that biomedical patents outnumber non-biomedical patents in three of 
the  top  US  universities  (Columbia,  Berkeley  and  Stanford).  This  dominance  of 
biomedical patents is perhaps a reflection of the fact that this area of research carries 
greater commercial promise. 
 
Along  with  a  surge  in  university  patenting  in  the  US  after  Bayh-Dole, 
commercialisation  of  university  innovations  and  technology  transfer  to  industry 
through licensing has also gone up. According to the report of the Association of 
University Technology Managers (AUTM) in 1998, there was a 75 per cent increase 9 
 
in  licenses  executed  between  1991  and  1997.  Although  this  reflects  the  positive 
attitude of universities towards appropriating returns from faculty research, it does not 
unequivocally establish a success story for commercialisation of university research 
as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act. Indeed, Thursby and Thursby (2002) show that the 
rise in the number of university licenses executed is definitely not commensurate with 
the massive increase in the number of university patents. Mowery et al (2001) reports 
that biomedical inventions accounted for the lion’s share of revenues generated from 
licensing of university patents. For the three universities studied by them, this share 
exceeded 80 percent of revenue generated from their respective top five inventions 
during  1985-1995.  University  generated  innovations  require  substantial 
“development”  after  licensing.  Based  on  a  survey  of  62  universities,  Jensen  and 
Thursby (2001) show that over 75 per cent of the licensed inventions were at the 
proof of concept stage and only 12 per cent were ready for commercial use. 
 
II.4  Consequences: Performance of Universities under the Bayh-Dole Act 
 
The observed surge in US university patenting and licensing was not necessarily a 
post-Bayh-Dole phenomenon. There were two categories of universities in the US 
prior to the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act. The first category included universities 
like  the  University  of  California,  Stanford  University,  MIT  and  University  of 
Wisconsin,  which  had the culture of  patenting and licensing  university  inventions 
even  before  the  Bayh-Dole  Act;  the  other  group  (which  included  prominent 
universities like Harvard, Columbia and Yale) were less active in this regard. Mowery 
et al (2001) observe that Columbia University started to actively patent and license 
only after 1980. 
 
The growth in the numbers of patents across US universities after the Bayh-Dole Act 
is  evidence of its  success  in generating university research for commercialisation. 
However,  there  are  other  aspects  that  quite  justifiably  attracted  serious  research 
attention.  We  now  discuss  some  of  this  literature  based  on  a  more  disaggregated 
profile  of  US  evidence,  focusing  specifically  on  issues  of  commercialisation  of 
university research, patent quality, research culture and focus, research funding and 
the role of the TTOs. 10 
 
II.4.i  Disclosure, Patenting and Licensing 
 
Commercialisation of university inventions arising out of public-funded research is a 
multi-step process. It begins with the inventor realising his invention to be patentable 
(in terms of novelty, inventive step and commercial application) and willingly seeking 
intellectual property rights protection through disclosure. The next step involves the 
award of patent. According to the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act, once the patent is 
granted, the patent title for all inventions arising out of federally funded research 
would be owned by the university itself. Naturally, in the third step, the responsibility 
of  licensing  these  patented  inventions  would  now  rest  with  the  university.  It  is 
presumed that the expected revenue gains from royalty would drive the university 
towards licensing their patents. Thus, broadly speaking, there are three steps leading 
to commercialisation of university inventions – disclosure, patenting and licensing. In 
this sub-section, we focus on these three activities of universities to understand the 
possible  consequences  of  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  for  commercialisation  of  university 
research. 
 
Thursby and Thursby (2002) model disclosure, patenting and licensing as a three-
stage production process involving multiple inputs at each stage. Faculty disclosure is 
modelled as a function of several inputs, both observable (including faculty size,
4 
research  funds  and  the  size  of  the  technology  transfer  office)  and  unobservable 
(propensity to disclose). In the second stage, patent application is considered to be the 
output determined by observable inputs (like number of disclosures, TTO size and a 
measure  of  faculty  quality)  and  an  unobservable  input  (the  propensity  to  patent, 
indicative of the commercial aggressiveness of the university administration). Finally, 
in the third stage, licensing is modelled as a function of observable inputs (including 
the number of disclosures, number of patent applications, the size of the TTO and 
faculty quality) and unobservable inputs (propensity to license reflecting the ability, 
knowledge and aggressiveness of the TTO in determining the fate of a patent). 
 
                                                 
4  This  is  represented  by  three  separate  variables  capturing  faculty  size  in  biological  sciences, 
engineering and physical sciences, keeping in mind the differences in methods and marketability of 
research in these areas. 11 
 
Using a sample of 64 universities, Thursby and Thursby (2002) estimated total factor 
productivity  (TFP)  growth  for  each  of  the  three  production  functions  using  data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). The estimated TFP growth rates were 12.1 per cent in 
the patent stage as compared to 2.7 per cent for disclosures and -1.7 per cent for 
licenses executed. From these estimates, Thursby and Thursby (2002) conclude that 
disclosures have gone up essentially due to the increase in direct inputs (like faculty 
size)  and  once  we  control  for  these  inputs,  the  increase  in  disclosures  due  to 
unobservable factors like rising propensity to disclose is only marginal. However, it is 
patenting that has shown a phenomenal rise even after controlling for direct inputs, 
including number of disclosures. Finally, licensing has effectively declined once we 
control  for  the  massive  increase  in  patenting,  although  the  number  of  licenses 
executed might have gone up in absolute terms. This perhaps reflects a decline in the 
commercial appeal of the rising number of disclosures and patents. 
 
In another paper exploring the nature of inventions licensed by universities, Colyvas 
et al (2002) presented case studies of inventions licensed by Columbia and Stanford. 
The  inventions  covered  fundamental  techniques,  biotechnology  research  tools, 
biological processes, medical devices and software programs. While most of the cases 
fell in the category of “embryonic” inventions, some of them were “ready-to-use” 
technologies. The paper suggests that intellectual property rights and exclusivity are 
likely  to  be  most  important  for  ensuring  industrial  development  of  “embryonic” 
inventions. 
 
II.4.ii  Quality of Patents 
 
It follows from the discussions presented in the previous section that US universities 
had experienced a surge in patenting after 1970 with a marked upward movement 
after 1980. Whether this growth in patenting could have been sustained without the 
Bayh-Dole Act remains an inconclusive debate in the literature (Mowery et al, 2001). 
However, a pertinent issue that has been extensively researched and debated in this 
context  is  whether  the  massive  rise  in  the  number  of  university  patents  has  been 
accompanied by any changes in the overall quality of such patents. 
 12 
 
Patent quality is judged in terms of both its importance as well as its generality. The 
index of importance constructed in terms of patent citations, discounting for second 
generation  citations,  is  a  measure  of  the  technological  impact  of  an  invention  as 
reflected  in  the  number  and  importance  of  its  descendants.  The  second  index 
formalises the generality of patents in terms of citations to capture the extent to which 
follow-up technical advances are spread across diverse technological fields, rather 
than being concentrated in just a few of them. 
 
Citation-based studies of US patents, notably by Henderson et al (1998), suggest that, 
before the mid-1980s, university patents used to receive more citations compared to 
patents from other sources and university patents were more widely cited in a diverse 
range of fields. Regressing the measures of importance and generality on a series of 
dummy variables capturing application years, technological areas and patent origin 
(university  versus  non-university),  Henderson  et  al  (1998)  found  that  university 
patents received almost 25 per cent more citations on an average and were 15 per cent 
more  general  (both  these  differences  being  highly  significant  statistically).  The 
regression was done controlling for possible field-specific effects and time effects. 
This difference was seen to be the largest in electronics and mechanical patents, and 
smallest in the drug/medical ones. However, this difference in the patent quality for 
university and non-university patents seemed to narrow down after 1983. This was 
attributed to the decline in the relative importance and generality of university patents, 
since there was no evidence of rising importance and generality of non-university 
patents. The declining quality of university patents triggered off apprehensions about 
the possible accumulation of low quality university patents in the US. 
 
However, Mowery et al (2002) show that the fall in patent quality after the Bayh Dole 
Act was not true for all universities. They argued that the poor performance of the 
entrants, as opposed to the incumbents, explains the overall decline in the quality of 
university  patents  in  the  US.
5  The  results  from  negative  binomial  and  probit 
regressions suggest that the entrants’ patent importance was significantly lower than 
that  of  the  incumbents  for  the  period  1981-86.  However,  these  differentials  were 
                                                 
5  These  two  terms  are  appropriately  defined  by  Mowery  et  al  (2002)  –  incumbents  being  those 
universities with at least six patents granted during 1975-80, while entrants as those having less than 
six patents during the same period. 13 
 
statistically insignificant for the period 1987-1992. Non-biomedical patents, for which 
the incumbent-entrant importance differential was the most pronounced during the 
1981-86 period, showed convergence during the later period. These results confirm 
that entrants’ patents quality has improved over time, while there has been no decline 
in the quality of incumbents’ patents. 
 
The  convergence  of  patent  quality  reflects  a  gradual  learning  process  for  the 
universities to patent their research outputs. Their experience and familiarity with the 
patenting process itself do matter. In the US, prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, it was the 
Research  Corporation  that  was  primarily  engaged  in  managing  the  patenting  and 
licensing  activities  of nearly 200  universities –  a task which later on became the 
responsibility of the technology transfer offices of the respective universities. One 
possible  explanation  is  that  TTOs  established  by  earlier  (incumbents)  were  more 
efficient  because  of  their  links  with  bodies  like  the  Research  Corporation.  The 
entrants  did  not  have  much  links  with  the  erstwhile  Research  Corporation  and, 
therefore,  had  little  by  way  of  learning  through  their  own  patenting  experience 
(Mowery et al, 2002). However, the entrants did enjoy the benefit of learning from the 
experience  of  successful  incumbents  through  various  direct  and  indirect  spillover 
effects  that  might  have  accounted  for  improvements  in  the  importance  of  entrant 
university patents during the late-1980s and the 1990s. 
 
II.4.iii  Effect on research focus and culture at the US universities 
 
The survey of three universities conducted by Mowery et al (2001) comes up with 
interesting insights on the focus and culture of university research. Nelson (2001), 
drawing  upon  this  survey,  says  that  the  allocation  of  university  research  effort 
between fundamental and applied research did not alter significantly after the Bayh-
Dole Act and there has not been any shift away from fundamental research. In other 
words,  according  to  Nelson  (2001),  university  research  has  not  become  any  less 
fundamental at these three universities after the Bayh-Dole Act. However, as far as 
research portfolios of US universities are concerned, there has been a definite shift 
towards  biomedical  research,  and  this  could  partly  explain  the  rise  in  university 
patenting and licensing after Bayh-Dole. However, it is not clear if the act itself has 
anything to do with this shift (Mowery et al 2001). 14 
 
With regard to research culture and motivation, the 11 case studies from Columbia 
University  and  Stanford  University  by  Colyvas  et  al  (2002)  failed  to  find  any 
evidence  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  expected  financial  gains  shape  scientists’ 
motivation to do research. According to this study, one cannot conclusively determine 
if scientists were indeed directed towards less fundamental or less “deep probing” 
research  because  of  the  policy  changes,  notably  the  Bayh-Dole  legislation.  As  a 
matter of fact, in many cases, the main objective of research was to make fundamental 
advances in research techniques and methods and the results of such research not only 
proved to be useful for other researchers in a wide range of areas and applications, 
they also had significant commercial appeal. 
 
Indeed, the very fact that over 75 per cent of the licensed inventions required further 
interactions between the inventor and the licensee to develop commercially viable 
products (Jensen and Thursby 2001) was a clear indication that university research 
continued  to  be  fundamental  in  nature,  the  increased  licensing  activity 
notwithstanding  (Rafferty  2008).  This  perhaps  suggests  that  more  areas  within 
university science could now be accessed through the market mechanism.
6 
 
There  has  been  a  long-standing  debate  on  whether  industrial  development  of 
university  research outputs through  the proprietary route  (patenting and licensing) 
actually stimulates scientific and technological progress. Studies on the post Bayh-
Dole  experience  seem  largely  inconclusive  with  regard  to  a  broader  debate  on 
privatisation of scientific commons. Scientific commons, largely promoted by public-
funded research, has broadened the knowledge base of modern science and created a 
culture of open science, encouraging competition among potential innovators (Nelson, 
2004). 
 
II.4.iv  R&D expenditure and research funding 
 
Given the fact that the Bayh-Dole Act made it easier for universities to license patents 
from public-funded R&D projects, it is likely that the Act actually affected the way 
                                                 
6  Nelson  (2004)  suggests  that,  post  Bayh-Dole,  there  had  been  profound  changes  in  the  ways 
universities gave access to their research results, with dissemination taking the patent route in more 
areas of science than it used to. On the other hand, US court rulings allowing patents in some areas of 
basic research increased incentives for for-profit firms to engage in areas of basic research. 15 
 
these projects were financed. Rafferty (2008) seems to be one of the few studies that 
use national level data on university R&D expenditure and activity (according to the 
character of research activity, namely, basic, applied or development) to analyse the 
impact of the Bayh-Dole Act. This paper considers aggregate R&D expenditure for 
basic  research,  applied  research  and  development  and  models  each  of  them  as  a 
univariate  autoregressive  process,  checking  for  structural  breakpoints  during  the 
period 1953-2002. The results suggest structural breaks for basic R&D in 1964, for 
applied R&D in 1976 and, surprisingly, no structural break for development. The 
Bayh-Dole  enactment  apparently  does  not  seem  to  coincide  with  either  of  the 
observed breaks. Hence, there is no reason to believe that the act played any role in 
promoting development R&D at the cost of basic R&D. The paper also finds rising 
industry funding of university research right from the 1970s, pre-dating the passage of 
the  Bayh-Dole  Act.  Rafferty  (2008),  therefore,  concludes  that  the  passage  of  the 
Bayh-Dole  Act  cannot  be  associated  with  any  statistically  significant  change  in 
university R&D activity or expenditure. 
 
Coupe (2003) analyses the direct real effects of university R&D expenditure in terms 
of patents generated. An estimated Poisson regression of patent numbers indicates that 
academic R&D production has constant returns to scale at the university level, with 
some indications of increasing returns at the aggregate level. For instance, universities 
as a whole applied for about 20 patents per billion US dollar spent on R&D in 1972, 
40  in  1985  and  more  than  100  in  1994.  However,  at  the  level  of  individual 
universities, such expenditure generally results in constant or even decreasing returns 
to  scale.  This  conclusion  has  clear  policy  implications  for  optimal  allocation  of 
federal research funds among competing recipients – whether or not to concentrate 
resources among selected institutions or universities or to spread it thinly across. 
 
II.4.v  The role of the TTOs 
 
The Bayh-Dole Act led to the creation of new organisational structures within the 
universities  through  the  establishment  of  technology  transfer  offices  (TTO).  The 
TTOs  were  meant  to  facilitate  patenting  of  university  research  and  its 
commercialisation.  The  number  of  universities  with  technology  transfer  offices 
increased from 25 in 1980, to 200 in 1990 and, by the end of the century, virtually all 16 
 
US universities created their TTOs. The TTOs were supposed to act as the interface 
between individual inventors, the university and the market for technologies. Since 
the TTOs were self-financing, they were presumably functionally autonomous.
7 
 
It has been contended that the spurt in university patenting and licensing post Bayh-
Dole was essentially spearheaded by the initiatives of the TTOs. Coupe (2003), based 
on maximum likelihood estimations, finds that a typical university, spending the mean 
expenditure on R&D, will have an expected number of patents that is about 45 per 
cent higher if it has a TTO compared to one without a TTO. Moreover, universities 
that established TTOs in response to the Bayh-Dole Act are most likely to experience 
increased licensing activity compared to those that did not establish one. This shows 
that  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  could  actually  play  its  intended  role  through  a  two-step 
process  of  creating  TTOs  in  the  first  place  and  patenting  and  commercialising 
university research thereafter. 
 
Jensen  and  Thursby  (2001),  through  a  survey  of  technology  managers  of  62  US 
universities, concluded that technology managers viewed themselves as balancing the 
interests of university administrators with those of the inventors. While the former 
considers revenue generation to be the most important, the latter is essentially inclined 
towards  sponsored  research.  For  TTOs,  generating  royalty  fees  was  extremely 
important, followed by activities leading to actual commercialisation of inventions. 
Facilitating sponsored research was found to be only moderately important, while the 
number of patents awarded seemed to be the least important. Using the Kendall’s t, 
Cohen’s  k  and  McNemar’s  test  to  test  for  the  association  between  the  nature  of 
responses from TTOs, university administration and faculty, it was concluded that for 
most of the outcomes, TTO managers’ objectives were more closely aligned with that 
of university administrators. 
 
                                                 
7 “Few (13 per cent) of the TTOs reported that their office is a part of a foundation, and 20 per cent 
reported that the university has a foundation that provides support for the TTO. Only 15 per cent of 
the TTOs are corporations that are separate from their universities, and 4.8 per cent are for-profit. On 
average, 42 per cent of the support for the TTOs is based on a line item in the university budget and 
43 per cent comes from royalties/license fees. Most (80 per cent) of the TTOs report directly to an 
academic  university  official  (typically,  the  vice  president  for  research)  rather  than  a  university 
business or finance official. More than 40 per cent use brokers or consultants to aid the TTO.” 
Thursby et al (2001). 17 
 
III.  University-Industry Interface & Technology Transfer From Public-Funded 
Research: The Us Experience 
 
The outcomes of public-funded research, spanning from knowledge and knowhow to 
technologies and prototypes, need to be transferred to agencies that would put in the 
necessary effort required to develop them further for scaling up and commercial use. 
Public-funded  research  has  evidently  played  a  significant  role  in  generating 
fundamental ideas (or techniques) that have contributed to the overall technological 
progress in a society,
8 while private in-house R&D has been driving specific product 
and process innovations that boost productivity, competitiveness, economic growth 
and welfare. Therefore, it is crucially important that the industry-university interface 
happens in a manner that  ensures best utilisation of university  generated  research 
results. However, such interactions are far from being linear in spirit or singular in 
approach.  This  brings  us  to  a  discussion  of  the  possible  channels  of  university-
industry  interface,  their  effectiveness  and  the  implications  for  university-industry 
technology transfer. 
 
Industry  might  consider  public-funded  research  as  a  breeding-ground  of  forward-
looking ideas that they could possibly harness for further development.
9 However, as 
we understand in the case of the US, such university-industry interface was not visible 
to the extent possible and desirable during the 1970s for various reasons – the lack of 
a  proper  IPR  framework  being  the  most  frequently  noted.  Indeed,  this  slack  in 
university-industry  technology  transfer  is  what  is  believed  to  have  fuelled  the 
legislative intervention in the form of the Bayh-Dole Act, 1980. 
 
Santoro and Chakrabarti (2002) identify technology transfer as one of the four main 
forms  of  industry-university  interaction.  The  other  three  forms  are  identified  as 
research  support,  co-operative  research  and  knowledge  transfer.  Research  support 
refers to contributions by industry to universities in the form of research funds and 
equipment. Co-operative research is supposed to be more interactive than research 
                                                 
8  Indeed,  the  key  role  played  by  universities  and  public  research  institutes  in  the  process  of 
technological  catch-up  has  been  highlighted  by  Mazzoleni  and  Nelson  (2007).  Jaffe  (1989) had 
earlier found a significant effect of university research on corporate patents in the areas of drugs and 
medical technology, electronics, optics and nuclear technology. 
9 A somewhat less ambitious expectation by industry is guided by their more specific and immediate 
needs (both with respect to minor trouble shooting and problem solving as well as major product and 
process development) through leveraging public-funded research and its associated talent pool. 18 
 
support and includes contract research with individual investigators, consulting by 
faculty, and group arrangements to address specifically immediate industry problems. 
Knowledge transfer broadly refers to formal and informal interactions, co-operative 
education, curriculum development and personnel exchanges, extending to research 
consortia, co-authoring of research papers by members of a university and industry 
and  employing  university  graduates.  Therefore,  knowledge  transfer  may  be 
considered to have a far-reaching and long-term  impact while  technology transfer 
serves more specific and immediate industry needs. It is under technology transfer 
that public-funded research provides both basic and technical knowledge along with 
the  technology  patent  and/or  licensing  services,  while  the  industrial  community 
provides a clear problem statement related to market demand in a specific applied 
area. The other most common forms of technology transfer have been identified as 
technological  consulting  arrangements,  sponsored  extension  services  and  joint 
ventures. 
 
Santoro and Chakrabarti (2002), based on a firm level survey in the US, shows that 
larger  (more  mechanistic)  firms  use  knowledge  transfer  and  research  support 
relationships  to  build  competencies  in  non-core  technological  areas.  By  contrast, 
smaller firms, particularly those in high tech industrial sectors, focus more on problem 
solving  in  core  technological  areas  through  technology  transfer  and  co-operative 
research relationships. 
 
Cohen et al (2002) use data from the Carnegie Mellon Survey on industrial R&D to 
evaluate the influence of “public” (i.e., university and government R&D lab) research 
on the US manufacturing sector and explore the pathways through which that effect is 
exercised. They have identified the following pathways of technology transfer (or 
sources  of  university  information)  –  patents,  informal  information  exchange, 
publications and reports, public meetings and conferences, recently hired graduates, 
licenses, joint or co-operative ventures, contract research, consulting, and temporary 
personnel  exchanges.  The  paper  reveals  that  41  per  cent  of  the  respondents  rate 
publications/reports as at least moderately important; it, therefore, forms the dominant 
channel.  Informal  information  exchange,  public  meetings  or  conferences,  and 
consulting are next in importance, accounting for 31 per cent to 36 per cent of the 
responses. Channels like recently hired graduates, joint and co-operative ventures and 19 
 
patents constitute 17 per cent to 21 per cent of the responses. Licenses and personnel 
exchange are found to be the least important channel with a share of less than 10 per 
cent. These results clearly indicate that for most industries, patents and licenses are 
not nearly as important as other channels of transferring public research results to 
industry,  especially  publications,  conferences,  informal  information  exchange,  or 
consulting. 
 
The above studies look at university-industry technology transfer from the demand 
side, i.e. the industry perspective. There are studies that look at the issue from the 
supply side, i.e. the university perspective. The new knowledge that is created through 
public-funded  research  is  generally  the  outcome  of  laboratory  experiments  or 
theoretical  analysis  and  is  generally  published  in  peer-reviewed  journals  and/or 
patented.  University  professors  have  traditionally  been  transferring  knowledge 
through mentoring students’ research, through conference presentations and notably 
through publications placed in the public domain. 
 
Agrawal and Henderson (2002) suggest that patents only represent a small proportion 
of all work being conducted within academia and may not be the representative mode 
of what we have so far been calling technology transfer. Their study of technology 
transfer from MIT is focused on the departments of mechanical engineering, electrical 
engineering and computer sciences. Their results show that on an average, only about 
10 to 20 per cent of faculty members in their sample patent their research in any given 
year and only three to seven per cent license their invention. However, more than 50 
per cent of them publish at least one paper in any given year. In a startling revelation, 
they conclude that half of their sample population have never patented at all. Clearly, 
publishing academic papers appears to be a far more important activity than patenting. 
The  paper  has  also  tried  to  give  important  insights  regarding  the  channels  of 
university-industry technology transfer drawing upon the perceptions of faculty. The 
relative importance of the channels of technology transfer, as perceived by the faculty, 
is summarised as: publications 18 per cent, conferences 5 per cent, consulting 26 per 
cent, conversations 6 per cent, collaborative research 12 per cent, co-supervising 9 per 
cent,  recruiting  graduates  17  per  cent  and  patents  and  licenses  7  per  cent.  These 
results suggest that a focus on patenting as a measure of the impact of university 20 
 
research must be carefully qualified, given the fact that patenting seems to play a 
relatively small role in the transfer of knowledge. 
 
IV.  Bayh-Dole Type Legislations In Other Countries 
 
Notwithstanding apprehensions regarding its possible unintended consequences, the 
Bayh-Dole Act has been credited with having  pulled the United States out of the 
slump that it had gone through in the 1960s and the 1970s. However, it took a while 
for the rest of the world to get enthused by the idea. It was only in the late 1990s that 
this US legislation was used as a guide to formulating IPR policies in some of the 
other nations – with significant influence on their innovation systems. 
 
Countries like Austria, Denmark and Norway changed their employment norms for 
academic staff by abolishing faculty rights on university-generated research results. 
Some OECD countries like Japan and Germany by now have legislations along the 
lines of the Bayh-Dole Act to energise the process of technology transfer from their 
universities. Most interestingly, the idea did appeal to the emerging economies as 
well. Countries like Brazil, China and South Africa already have similar legislations 
in place, while in India the process of enacting a similar law is underway.
10 In this 
section, we present an overview of the experiences of selected countries with a Bayh-
Dole type legislation, to further our understanding of how patenting of public-funded 
research may be used as an effective instrument of public policy. 
 
Historically in Europe, patents arising out of academic research were either assigned 
to  firms  that  may  have  funded  the  researchers,  or  were  taken  by  the  academic 
inventor. In any case, there never was a strong tradition of patenting and licensing of 
university research in Europe. Some technology transfer did occur through patents 
produced in universities, but these were mostly owned by companies (Bacchiocchi 
and  Montobbio,  2009).  Elaborating  on  the  long  standing  European  practices  of 
technology  transfer  from  universities,  the  study  reports  that  in  Germany  (like  in 
                                                 
10 But this is not to suggest that this bandwagon has been pervasive. Countries like Sweden have not 
abolished professor’s privilege and Canada still does not have a separate legislation similar to the 
Bayh-Dole Act. However, there has been consistent effort in Canada towards harmonising divergent 
rules of IP ownership by universities, at least with respect to R&D funded by the federal government 
(WIPO). 21 
 
Denmark, Sweden and Austria), there was the so called professor’s privilege allowing 
university professors to retain the property rights on their research results. In the UK, 
France  and  Italy,  however,  universities  and  research  centres  maintained  that 
employers  retain  intellectual  property  rights  over  their  research.  In  France,  some 
universities  (in  particular  the  CNRS)  did  pay  serious  attention  to  the  issue  of 
intellectual property ownership. However, Italian universities did not bother much 
about intellectual property rights and private companies were allowed to retain patent 
ownership (Balconi et al 2004). 
 
Although similar in nature to the US policy framework, recent policy developments in 
some of the European countries with respect to patenting of university research are 
perhaps less extensive than the Bayh-Dole Act (Guena and Nesta, 2006). Prominent 
European nations, which initiated changes in their provisions for intellectual property 
ownership in the case of public-funded research, include Denmark and France (in 
1999), Germany (in 2001), Norway (in 2003) and Italy (in 2005). 
 
Germany  in  2001  introduced  reform  of  the  Employee  Law  whereby  IPRs  were 
transferred to the university from individual inventors.  This led to the establishment 
of  patent  valorisation  agencies  (PVAs)  in  Germany,  mandated  to  manage  the 
patenting activities of one or more German universities (OECD 2003, Mowery and 
Sampat 2004). In Norway, policy changes in this regard took place in 2003 though 
there is little by way of evidence on the consequences of these policy changes. The 
Italian  case  is  very  interesting.  They  assigned  the  ownership  rights  of  university 
generated patents to researchers in the first place in 2001, but reversed it in 2005. At 
present, Italian universities are allowed to hold patents for all inventions coming from 
externally funded research, with certain exceptions in the case of research undertaken 
with sole institutional funding. 
 
A detailed study on Denmark by Valentin and Jensen (2006), focusing on some of the 
consequences of such policy moves (Sweden, with no such policy changes, was taken 
as the control), suggests that the Danish Law on University Patenting (LUP), which 
came  into  force  in  January  2000,  transferred  the  right  to  patent  any  university 
invention to the concerned university even if the research was undertaken through 
collaborations with industry. Sweden on the other hand, continued with their older 22 
 
system  of  professor’s  privilege.  The  study  attempted  to  assess  and  compare  the 
contribution of university scientists to inventions patented by dedicated biotech firms 
(DBFs) specialising in drug discovery in the two countries. Denmark initiated such 
legal  and  procedural  norms  in  the  wake  of  growing  participation  of  university 
scientists in industry-owned patents. The study confirms that, post-LUP, there has 
been an observable increase in the total number of patents held by universities in 
Denmark compared to Sweden. However, on the flipside, they find that the previous 
trend  of  academic  participation  in  company-owned  patents  (here,  drug  discovery 
research) has suffered in Denmark because of the introduction of the LUP. Such an 
adverse  effect  has  been  attributed  to  the  fact  that  a  typical  joint  university-DBF 
research project does not fit well into LUP’s requirement of ex-ante allocation of IPR 
to  universities.  The  core  hindrance  for  firms  to  engage  in  a  joint  (collaborative) 
exploratory work in drug research with universities was that they were not willing to 
invest in the transformation phase leading to an actual drug without having secured 
the patent rights themselves. It must also be noted that this variant of the Bayh-Dole, 
implemented in Denmark as the LUP, is rather strong in terms of its reach – it extends 
to university-industry collaborative research and not merely public-funded research. 
 
In  the  UK,  much  of  technology  transfer  in  the  public  research  system  has  been 
achieved without intellectual property ownership laws like the Bayh-Dole Act. It is 
evident from the UK Patents Act, 1977, that the ownership of intellectual property 
rights  was  clearly  allocated  to  universities  for  all  research  undertaken  within  a 
university.  Universities  in  the  UK  firmly  advocated  employer  status  over  their 
research staff and retained the discretion to patent research outputs. This is in contrast 
to the pre-Bayh-Dole provisions in the US, which were unclear on who owned the 
rights to inventions generated out of public-funded research. Some indicative figures 
for the state of commercialisation of university research from the 1996 report of the 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology suggests that the total number of 
patents held by 34 UK universities was 510. The highest number held by any one 
establishment  was  60.  Out  of  the  10,000  patents  granted  by  the  UKPO  per  year, 
universities are only a small contributor. UK universities, on average, earn income 
from  patents  equivalent  to  between  one  and  two  per  cent  of  their  total  research 
expenditure.  The  British  Government  came  up  with  new  policy  guidelines  for  IP 
ownership in academic research, following the publication of the Baker Report in 23 
 
August  1999.
11 The new policy reaffirmed that the  ownership  of IP generated by 
public-funded  research  would  reside  with  the  research  provider  as  the  body  best 
placed  for  such  exploitation  unless  compelling  factors  like  national  security, 
dissemination  of  information,  aggregation  of  work,  purchasers’  own  standards, 
regulatory responsibilities or the research provider’s lack of resources came in the 
way (The Patent Office UK). 
 
Apart  from  some  of  the  European  countries  discussed  so  far,  Japan  has  also 
introduced  its  version  of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1999  to  shift intellectual property 
rights  from  individual  inventors  to  the  organisations  they  worked  for 
(http://www.nsftokyo.org/rm04-05.html).  Collins  and  Wakoh  (2000)  explain  this 
policy move in the light of the IPR arrangements that existed earlier and the very 
limited  technology  transfer  that  took  place  from  Japanese  universities  to  industry 
through  patenting  and  licensing.  In  fact,  they  find  little  evidence  to  support  any 
significant licensing activity on the part of Japanese universities; royalty incomes for 
these universities were reported to be negligible. It has been also shown that the total 
number of patent applications made by universities had actually declined after the late 
1980s. Even in the case of industry-university research collaborations, the Japanese 
experience was not very encouraging prior to 1999. The earlier system of assigning 
intellectual property rights to the inventor implied added procedural and bureaucratic 
hurdles due to the involvement of intermediary organisations in the process of IPR 
management, like the Japan Society for Promotion of Science (an advisory body to 
the Education Ministry). These considerations prompted Japan to adopt the Bayh-
Dole styled  legislation in  1999. Alongside this legislative intervention, Japan  also 
focused on reforming organisational structures for intellectual property management 
by  creating  technology  licensing  offices  (TLOs)  in  universities  to  facilitate  the 
process of commercialisation of university research. 
 
Emerging economies like Brazil, China, and South Africa have, of late, refrained from 
being  silent  onlookers  to  the  development  trajectories  of  the  early  industrialised 
nations and their periodic experiments with public policy towards competitiveness. 
On July 5, 2004, the House of Representatives of the Brazilian Congress approved an 
                                                 
11 “Creating Knowledge Creating Wealth – Realising the Economic Potential of Public Sector Research 
Establishments” Published by HM Treasury August 1999 24 
 
innovation law that is meant to provide incentives to increase innovation activity and 
facilitate scientific and technological research. China passed its amended S&T law on 
December 29, 2007, which became effective from July 1, 2008. Seemingly, this law is 
flexible in terms of favouring patent ownership of either the scientist or the institution 
in the case of publicly funded research. Effectively, this law was passed to redefine 
the range of patentable research outputs in China. South Africa enacted its Intellectual 
Property Rights Bill in December 2008. The specific object of this legislation is to 
ensure  that  intellectual  property  resulting  from  publicly  financed  research  and 
development  should  be  commercialised  for  the  benefit  of  all  South  Africans  and 
protected from misappropriation. 
 
Among  policy  makers,  especially  in  emerging  economies,  Bayh-Dole  type 
legislations are generally thought to be a panacea to solve all problems regarding 
incentivising innovation and technology transfer. Some of these countries (like Brazil 
or India) have been spending large amounts on public sector R&D as a matter of 
policy  for  several  decades  now.  However,  these  initiatives  have  often  failed  to 
generate  enough  momentum  for  cutting-edge  innovations  from  public-funded 
research, notwithstanding the large number of experimental and sponsored research 
projects in  the  universities and  research laboratories.  However,  one  is not  sure  if 
institutionalising IPR in academic research would indeed energise the quantity and 
quality of research for economic growth and progress to the extent desired. 
 
The literature on other country experiences, not surprisingly, is somewhat limited, 
given that the legislative interventions in these countries have been a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Unlike in US literature, we fail to find much evidence-based analysis of 
the  implications  and  consequences  of  such  Bayh-Dole  type  legislations  in  these 
countries. 
 
V.  Patenting Public-Funded Research: The Debate 
 
The  empirical  literature  so  far  discussed  contains  rigorous  analyses  of  the 
consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980) in the US. Evidently, there is a strong 
lobby  of  policy  makers  and  stakeholders  across  the  world,  which  believes  in  the 
positive influence of such legal interventions in stimulating the process of technology 25 
 
transfer from university research. However, the policy debate is not as unidirectional 
and linear as might appear at first glance. The key issues that form the discourse in 
this regard are rather broad and complex. 
 
First, it is unclear whether the outputs of government-funded research projects are 
more effectively disseminated through publications (available in the public domain) 
than  through  patenting.  Second,  it  is  debatable  whether  patenting  and  exclusive 
licensing should assume the most important mode of university-industry interface, 
ignoring other important and, perhaps, more effective channels. Third, such public 
policy to promote exclusive licensing of public-funded research has its flip side in 
terms of monopoly rent-seeking on publicly funded research outputs by industry. This 
effectively implies double-taxation of taxpayers (Eisenberg, 1996). Finally, it is yet to 
be ascertained whether intellectual property rights can actually incentivise scientific 
research. 
 
Moreover, there are serious concerns regarding possible, “unintended” consequences 
of Bayh-Dole type legislations Act. For instance, the excessive thrust on monetary 
incentives (beyond the traditional norms of academic rewards) might shift the focus of 
public-funded research away from basic to more applied (and commercially oriented) 
fields and thus hamper the pursuit and progress of “science” (Nelson 2004, Mowery et 
al 2001). Another issue arising out of the Bayh-Dole Act relates to expanding the 
scope  of  patentable  research  to  include  a  wide  range  of  output  in  areas  of  basic 
research and research tools. It is also argued that the culture of patenting might lead to 
an  uneasy  environment  of  secrecy  and  may  impede  and  delay  the  process  of 
information sharing. Remotely though, such tendencies come in the way of potential 
collaborations crucially important for large-scale scientific research. 
 
V.1  Dissemination: Publication vs. Patents 
 
There  is  a fundamental  philosophical  domain of  intellectual  debate  that  addresses 
concerns  related  to  the  privatisation  of  scientific  commons.  According  to  Nelson 
(2004), Bayh-Dole endorsed the notion that dedicating research results to the public 
commons  discourage  the  use  of  these  results.  However,  he  strongly  believes  that 
university research is most effectively disseminated to users if they are placed in the 26 
 
public domain. Indeed, exclusive (or restricted) licensing may deter widespread use at 
considerable economic and social cost. Nelson (2004) also points out that the current 
zeal of universities for patenting represents a major shift from universities’ traditional 
support of open science. The paper highlights the potential downside of exclusive 
licensing of university research results. This may be particularly relevant in the case 
of  research  tools,  medical  remedies  etc  that  are  meant  for  wider  application. 
Nevertheless,  initially  the  argument  supporting  Bayh-Dole  focused  primarily  on 
pharmaceuticals where patent protection continues to be justified. 
 
Dasgupta  (2000) analyses the choice between ‘disclosure and publication-priority’ 
versus  ‘secrecy  and  patents’.  He  argues  that  inventors  are  often  faced  with  such 
choices where the urge to disclose their findings to the world at large clashes with the 
compulsion to restrict their spread to earn commercial rents from them. Taking into 
account the principal arguments behind the Bayh-Dole act, Mazzoleni (2006) tries to 
theoretically model R&D competition to determine conditions under which IPR and 
exclusive  licensing  induce  an  increase  in  downstream  R&D  and  explores  the 
implications of “open access” versus “university patenting” in terms of social welfare. 
He shows that under “university patenting”, the equilibrium number of firms engaged 
in the development of embryonic inventions is clearly less than the optimal level. He 
argues that in the case of a transition from an “open access” to “university patenting” 
regime, if the aggregate R&D spending is below the socially efficient level under 
“open  access”,  then  university  patenting  decreases  social  welfare  unambiguously. 
However, if a patent race takes place among firms engaged in down-stream R&D 
under “open access”, then university patenting may either decrease or increase social 
welfare. Even when the “university patenting” regime brings about an increase in 
social welfare, it does so only at the expense of consumer surplus. 
 
V.2  Importance of Patents as a Channel of Technology Transfer 
 
To  understand  the  importance  of  patents  as  a  means  of  technology  transfer  from 
academic research, we take a look at some factual evidence provided by Agrawal and 
Henderson (2002). They suggest that patents represent only a small proportion of all 
research being conducted within academia and may not be the representative mode of 
technology transfer. Publishing academic papers is far more important an activity for 27 
 
university faculty than patenting. Even from the perspective of the industry, as shown 
by  Cohen  et  al  (2002),  patents  and  licenses  are  not  nearly  as  important  as  other 
channels of transferring public research results to industry, especially publications, 
conferences, informal information exchange, or consulting. 
 
V.3  Knowledge as a Public Good 
 
Encouraging patenting of university research to the extent of enacting laws (Bayh-
Dole Act) may be in direct conflict with the “public good” nature of university R&D. 
Government subsidised academic research is based on the premise that the benefits or 
knowledge  derived  from  these  scientific  discoveries  would  remain  in  the  public 
domain (Devaney 2004). Eisenberg (1996) is critical of the Bayh-Dole Act on the 
ground that it was actually counterintuitive to provide incentives to patent and restrict 
access  to  discoveries  made  through  public  funding  in  institutions  that  have 
traditionally been the principal performers of basic research. There is a possibility that 
this might result in shrinking the public domain of scientific research on the one hand 
and taxing the general taxpayer twice before they can actually enjoy the fruits of such 
research by purchasing the follow-on patented product from the market at the rent 
seeking price charged by the patent holder. 
 
V.4  IPR and the progress of Scientific Research 
 
Whether IPR promotes research at universities has also been highly debated. It has 
been argued that if the discoverer or the developer of a knowledge output can control 
its use, it acts as a major incentive for them to carry out research (Nelson 2004). Post 
Bayh-Dole, many members of the academic and scientific fraternity in the US began 
to think of their discoveries as private, valuable, and licensable products or processes 
(Slaughter and Rhodes 1996). Theoretically, one can also argue that when research is 
sequential  and  builds  upon  previous  discoveries,  stronger  patents  may  discourage 
subsequent research on valuable, but potentially infringing, follow-on inventions. In 
debating the usefulness of patent enforcement, it is argued that stronger patent rights 
are both a blessing and a curse. Such provisions protect the patent holder in terms of 
future infringements but it also makes the same inventor vulnerable to charges of 28 
 
infringement of the work of previous inventors. Thus, the link between patent strength 
and innovation incentives is highly ambiguous (Gallini 2002). 
 
V.5  Unintended Consequences of Patenting Scientific Research 
 
Apart  from  the  issues  highlighted  so  far,  there  may  be  several  other  “unintended 
consequences” as evident from the US experience. We discuss some of them. 
 
V.5.1  Financial Motivation and Focus of Research 
 
Nelson (2001) comments on the possible conflict of interest when faculty members 
have overlapping financial and scientific interest in certain areas of research like those 
related  to  new  medical  treatments.  Several  American  research  universities  have 
established  faculty  committees  to  deal  with  such  conflicts  as  and  when  they  are 
reported. However, concerns that the expectation of financial gain could adversely 
affect  the  motivation  for  university  research  have  been  allayed  by  Colyvas  et  al 
(2002). Based on case studies, they concluded that financial returns do not appear to 
have played a significant role in motivating research among scientists. 
 
Gallini (2002) makes an important observation regarding the possible redirection of 
research effort from basic research to potentially ‘lucrative’ applied research because 
of the Bayh-Dole Act. Mowery et al (2001) found that while there is a perceptible 
change in the research portfolio of US universities towards biomedical research, there 
is no evidence of any significant shifts away from fundamental research. 
 
V.5.2  Range of Patentable Outputs 
 
The objective of the Bayh-Dole Act was to facilitate utilisation of patents resulting 
from university research, without changing the range of output that universities patent 
(Sampat 2006). However, several court decisions in the US after the Bayh-Dole Act 
expanded the patenting provisions beyond ‘technologies’ to include elements of basic 
research and research tools. Thus, research output on an increasingly wider range of 
subject  matter  could  be  patented  (Gallini  2002).  Nelson  (2004)  argues  that  the 
potential  problems  associated  with  expanding  the  scope  of  patents  into  the 29 
 
conventional realms of science could be alarming. Conventionally, scientific facts or 
principles  or  natural  phenomena  are  not  patentable.  However,  the  Supreme  Court 
judgment  in  the  famous  Diamond  vs.  Chakrabarty  case  (1980)  upheld  the  US 
principle to define patentable subject matter to “include anything under the sun that is 
made  by  man”.  The Bayh-Dole  Act  did  not  distinguish  between  patents  on  basic 
versus  applied  science,  although  ignoring  this  subtlety  might  have  serious 
consequences.  While  patents  on  commercially  viable  inventions  foster  product 
development,  patents  on  basic  scientific  discoveries  may  impose  serious  costs  on 
entrepreneurial science that have no economic justification (Devaney, 2004). 
 
V.5.3  Secrecy 
 
To establish the link between the ‘culture of patenting’ and ‘secrecy’, one may argue 
that, typically, the financial incentives embodied in patents may discourage academics 
from sharing knowledge, data and other material with their peers. However, Walsh et 
al (2007) find that while access to knowledge inputs is largely unaffected by patents 
in  biomedical  research,  access  to  materials  used  may  be  restricted  because  of 
scientific competition. Pineda (2006) discusses rather the far-reaching influence of the 
Bayh-Dole  Act  in  affecting  the  mood  and  spontaneity  of  international  scientific 
collaborations.  Although  international  collaborations  are  recognised  as  a  common 
scientific  endeavour,  economic and institutional  obstacles  might  prevent  access  to 
both codified and tacit knowledge. The legislative initiatives in developed countries 
(led  by  US  through  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  in  1980)  changed  the  academic  research 
environment by implementing special secrecy provisions to protect the patentability 
of research in progress. This has adversely affected the culture of hosting foreign 
research scholars.  Pineda (2006) also cites cases where it is seen that such legislative 
frameworks  have  prompted  developed  country  universities  to  adopt  an  extremely 
aggressive  stance  when  negotiating  collaborations  with  their  developing  country 
counterparts in a bid to stake claim on the intellectual property arising out of joint 
research. 
 
To  conclude,  it  is  conceded  that  commodification  of  science-based  intellectual 
knowledge  through  patenting  will  lead  to  greater  contract-based  regulations  and 
bureaucratisation in research universities (Slaughter and Rhodes 1996).  Specifically, 30 
 
it has been observed that universities’ efforts to enhance the commercial value of life 
sciences research have serious consequences that include politicisation of government 
research funding, disparity across universities and changes in the culture of academic 
research (Powell and Owen-Smith 1998). 
 
VI.  Patenting Public-Funded Research In India – Policy Lessons from the US 
Bayh-Dole Experience 
 
Over the past decade and a half, India has emerged as a major player in the world 
economy. According to Ray (2008), if one looks at India’s economic progress in the 
last decade or so, it is quite evident that knowledge intensive industries have been 
driving India’s growth, be it IT, biotech or pharmaceuticals among the many skill 
intensive  sectors.  The  role  of  technology  and  high-end  human  capital  in  India’s 
economic success cannot be overemphasised, thanks to its post-colonial policy thrust 
on higher education (specifically scientific and technical) and public-funded S&T. 
 
VI.1  The Landscape of Public-Funded Research in India 
 
Science  in  India,  as  understood  from  the  perspectives  of  research,  technology 
generation and human resource generation primarily through government initiatives, 
posits an interesting evolutionary picture. The edifice of science in India stands on a 
very complex but appropriately integrated network of public-funded institutions at 
various  levels,  comprising  of  universities,  research  laboratories  and  various  other 
autonomous organisations. Although these institutions are differently identified, based 
on pre-conceived mandates for their research focus and skill generation, they might 
not operationally be very different from one another. Arguably, in most cases, their 
activities overlap in the primary disciplines of scientific research and modes of human 
resource  generation  –  divergences  in  the  institute  specific  expertise,  facilities  and 
infrastructure notwithstanding. However, science research in India reflects enormous 
heterogeneity in terms of quality and in many cases has experienced a rather slow 
pace of change. 
 
India’s  post-independence  vision  of  home-grown  science  and  technology  was  in 
perfect  consonance  with  its  broader  policy  goal  of  self-reliance  in  practically  all 31 
 
spheres  of  economic  activity.  Although  India’s  economic  performance  under  this 
broad  policy  regime  during  the  first  four  decades  after  independence  is  highly 
debated, there is little disagreement that it was only because of India’s post-colonial 




The  network  of  institutions,  universities  and  organisations  that  ideally  represent 
science research in India is vast and impressive. To sketch the entire map of the S&T 
landscape  in  India  and  portray  the  broad  co-ordinates  of  the  role  of  different 
organisations  in  the  S&T  landscape  of  India,  we  use  the  following  diagram 













Figure 1:  Network of Public-Funded Science Research in India 
 
As the figure above shows, the canvas of India’s science research and education is 
very broad and complex. The task of building up a nation-wide infrastructure for 
higher  education  in  science  and  technology  rests  with  the  department  of  higher 
education  under  the  Ministry  of  Human  Resource  Development  (MHRD).  The 
MHRD  has  constituted  the  University  Grants  Commission  (UGC)  and  several 
professional  bodies  to  overlook  the  functioning  of  the  otherwise  autonomous 
universities and institutions. Universities in India are understood to perform research 
in various core disciplines of science and engineering along with training students up 
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to the doctoral and post-doctoral levels. The number of central universities at present 
is 39 and the number of state universities stands at 251. Note that at the time of 
independence there were just 20 universities in all in India. Of late, the UGC has also 
built inter-university centres at various places (like the Inter-University Accelerator 
Centre, New Delhi and the Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics, 
Pune) as specialised centres with highly sophisticated facilities and infrastructure for 
common use. Out of the 39 central universities, 12 were established only this year 
(2009) under the Central Universities Act, 2009. 
 
For technical education, MHRD has set up the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), 
followed by the Indian Institutes of Information Technology (IIITs) and the National 
Institutes of Technology (the NITs). Today, there are seven IITs located at Bombay, 
Delhi, Kanpur. Kharagpur, Madras, Guwahati and Roorkee. There are proposals to 
open eight more. The IITs are governed by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 and 
are principally responsible for churning out high quality engineering graduates and to 
conduct research in relevant fields. IITs have also ventured into research and teaching 
in basic science disciplines like physics, chemistry and mathematics. Thus, we notice 
that there is co-existence of the traditional university system along with competently 
designed apex institutions for technical education (IITs) under the MHRD. 
 
Alongside broad-based technical education and research, it has always been felt that 
research in basic sciences is equally important for India and it is, therefore, equally 
important to produce scientists of the highest calibre from its own institutions. This 
required institutes with highly competent research faculty and excellent infrastructure. 
India  was  fortunate  to  have  institutes  like  the  Indian  Institute  of  Science  (IISc), 
Bangalore, established under private patronage of Jamshetji Tata in the early decades 
of the last century. After independence, IISc has been publicly funded, and recently 
given  a  privileged  status  by  the  central  government.  The  objective  is  to  help  the 
institution reach the highest echelons of cutting-edge scientific research. The central 
government has very recently set up five Indian Institutes of Science Education and 
Research (IISERs) on the lines of IISc.
13 
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Having discussed the primary role played by the poster-boys of higher education in 
India,  we  come  to  the  second  group  of  S&T  organisations,  primarily  under  the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MST), which have evolved parallel to the IITs 
and other institutes of higher learning. Some of them command equal prestige and 
recognition. 
 
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (the CSIR) under the Department 
of Scientific and Industrial Research of the MST covers an extensive network of 40 
public-funded research laboratories and 100 field stations spread across the country. 
These are dedicated to R&D in well-defined areas for industrial application and are 
solely  aimed  at  achieving  technological  self-reliance  and  facilitating  technology 
transfer.  CSIR  today  boasts  of  a  diverse  portfolio  of  research,  which  includes 
biotechnology,  chemicals,  aerospace  etc.  Many  of  the  CSIR  laboratories  have 
designed their own doctoral programmes in various applied and multi-disciplinary 
areas. However, in most cases, these programmes are run closely in association with a 
central university for the award of the degree and evaluation. 
 
There are several autonomous S&T organisations, primarily funded by the department 
of science and technology under MST. Some of them engage primarily in research in 
basic sciences and enjoy international repute. These include the Indian Association for 
the  Cultivation  of  Sciences  (IACS,  established  way  back  in  1876),  Bose  Institute 
(established by Sir Jagdish Bose), S. N. Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences (all 
in  Kolkata),  Indian  Institute  for  Astrophysics,  Raman  Research  Institute  and 
Jawaharlal  Nehru  Centre  for  Advanced  Scientific  Research  (JNCASR)  (all  in 
Bangalore). All these research institutes run their doctoral programmes and consider 
training research students an integral part of their research mission. 
 
The Department of Bio-technology (DBT), established in 1986, has been a relatively 
new addition to the existing structure within the MST. This department takes a two- 
pronged approach to boost modern biotechnology and biomedical research in India. It 
funds premier autonomous institutes dedicated to focused areas of research within the 
broader ambit of biotechnology. It also awards sponsored research projects as well as 
network  projects  to  various  institutes,  research  laboratories  and  university 
departments.  Biotechnology  research  in  India  is  today  carried  out  in  most  S&T 34 
 
organisations, IITs and universities. This speaks of the vigour and enthusiasm with 
which  biotechnology  is  being  pursued  in  India  for  industrial  applications,  drug 
development and agricultural innovations. The prominent institutes working in this 
field include the National Institute of Immunology (NII) and the National Institute for 
Plant Genome Research (NIPGR), both in Delhi. 
 
The two other important departments under MST, namely the Department of Atomic 
Energy and the Department of Space, engage in strategic areas of S&T research in 
India. Both have been successful in carrying out cutting-edge research in their fields 
and  have  benefited  from  international  collaborations.  Apart  from  the  MHRD  and 
MST, the other key ministries of the central government which patronise research in 
related areas of science and technology include the ministries of defence, health and 
family  welfare  and  agriculture.  These  have  their  own  flagship  organisations 
responsible  for  core  research  tasks  –  the  Defence  Research  and  Development 
Organisation  (DRDO),  the  Indian  Council  for  Medical  Research  (ICMR)  and  the 
Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) respectively. These bodies have an 
organisational  structure similar  to  that of  the Council for  Scientific and  Industrial 
Research (CSIR) and consist of a network of public sector research laboratories, each 
of which is devoted to a particular type of research in their respective fields. 
 
VI.2  Public Funded R&D – Expenditure and Outcomes 
 
Research and Development expenditure as a percentage of GNP in 2005-06 stood at 
0.89 per cent.
14  In 2005-06,  the government  incurred 74.1  per  cent of total R&D 
expenditure  with  the  remaining  25.9  per  cent  being  accounted  for  by  the  private 
sector. Of the total government expenditure, the central government accounts for the 
lion’s share (57.5  per  cent of  total  R&D expenditure).  The bulk (86  per cent) of 
central government expenditure on R&D gets distributed among the major scientific 
agencies listed in the previous section, namely CSIR, DRDO, DAE, DBT, DST, DOS, 
MOES, ICAR, ICMR, MCIT etc. DRDO gets the highest share (about 34.4 per cent). 
Apart  from  providing  the  core funding  for  its  own  agencies and  laboratories,  the 
                                                 
14 A quick international comparison reveals that developed countries on an average spends over two per 
cent of their GDP on R&D, a cut above India’s spending. China spends 1.42 per cent of its GDP on 
R&D, again ahead of India. However, another emerging economy, Brazil, is somewhat close to India 
with 0.82 per cent of GDP being spent on R&D. 35 
 
central government also allocates project-specific funds to the academic sector. This 
is  known  as  extra-mural  funding  and  the  three  departments  (DST,  DBT  and  the 
Ministry  of  Communications  and  Information  Technology  (MCIT))  together 
disbursed the highest extra-mural support during 2005-06.
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The pool of patents generally represents tangible R&D outcomes for S&T efforts by a 
particular country. It is believed that these patents hold the key to innovations and 
competitiveness.  Out  of  the  total  number  of  patents  granted  in  India  in  2006-07 
(7539), 74.7 per cent were in the name of foreign citizens and only 25.3 per cent were 
assigned  to  Indian  citizens.  Although  patenting  is  still  not  very  common  among 
academic researchers in India, some of the S&T institutions, particularly the CSIR 
network, have put in place an institutional framework to encourage patenting of their 
research output. It may be noted  that the  number of  US  patents  granted to CSIR 
jumped to 196 in 2005 from just six in 1990-91 (Kaul, 2006). 
 
Though there appears to have been a spurt in patenting activity from a handful of 
laboratories, very few of these patents have actually been licensed to industry. It has 
to be kept in mind that public sector R&D in India did not contribute significantly to 
improve industrial competitiveness and encourage technological learning by Indian 
industry. Even though Indian universities and research institutions have been quite 
active  in  their  research  pursuits,  their  interface  with  industry  has  remained  sub-
optimal  (Ray, 2003).  It is  now felt  that India’s transition  to  a knowledge- driven 
economy would be much easier if the available research potential of its huge pool of 
premier  universities  and  institutions  could  be  harnessed  for  effective  commercial 
application and industrial development. 
 
On the publication front, the scenario appears to be more encouraging. Based on core 
databases,  DST  reports  that  the  total  number  of  papers  from  public  sector  R&D 
institutions increased from 59315 in 2001 to 89297 in 2005. The distribution of the 
publications  according  to  research  areas  show  that,  in  2005,  physical  sciences 
                                                 
15  It  may  be  noted  that  the  government  also  spends  on  industrial  R&D  through  its  public  sector 
industries. In case of industrial R&D, defence industries in the public sector accounted for 38.8 per 
cent of R&D expenditure followed by the fuels industry in the public sector with 24.2 per cent in 
2005-06.  Private  sector  industrial  R&D  expenditure  was  primarily  concentrated  in  drugs  and 
pharmaceuticals with 45.1 per cent followed by transportation with 16.7 per cent. 36 
 
accounted  for  11  per  cent  (9574),  agricultural  sciences  18.5  per  cent  (16526), 
biological sciences 14 per cent (12491), chemical sciences 26.5 per cent (23668), 
engineering 13 per cent (11,945), and medical sciences 14 per cent (12142). Overall, 
India’s contribution in world publications has increased marginally from 2.1 per cent 
during  the  1995-2000  to  2.3  per  cent  during  2000-2005.  With  this  increase,  the 
effective contribution of Indian scientists in the international scientific community has 
also risen. Although India’s impact factor (average number of citations per paper) is 
not yet at par with the world average in most scientific fields, it has made significant 
gains in physics, with an average of 3.13 cites per paper for the period 2003 to 2007. 
 
VI.3  Streamlining IPR for Public-funded research: Lessons for India 
 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) related concerns did not bother Indian scientists for 
a long time. Dedicating research outputs to the public domain for free use and follow-
on research was a standard practice in public-funded research. However, this has often 
been  viewed  as  ‘lethargy’  towards  active  participation  in  commercialisation  of 
inventions on the part of Indian academic community. This is not to suggest that 
Indian  policy  makers  did  not  realise  the  importance  of  publicly  funded  scientific 
research and the possible role it could play in boosting industrial competitiveness. But 
university-industry interface has remained sub-optimal and institutional research has 
failed to adequately contribute to industrial catch-up in India (Ray, 2006). 
 
There is considerable policy debate on whether inadequate and loosely defined IPR 
provisions  for  academic  research  in  its  present  form  in  India  has  indeed  posed  a 
serious  bottleneck  in  facilitating  successful  commercialisation  of  public-funded 
inventions. In India, unfortunately, much of the inventions generated out of public-
funded research remain unnoticed by industry, and even when noticed, not picked up 
by them due to heavy development costs and uncertainties. It is argued, therefore, that 
industry is reluctant to make this investment unless the embryonic innovations are 
protected by secured intellectual property rights (IPR) owned by the university with 
exclusive licensing provisions. Accordingly, there is now a concerted effort to put in 
place institutional framework for IPR on public-funded research in India. Indeed, the 
National  Knowledge  Commission  of  India  (NKC)  came  up  with  a  strong 
recommendation  for  a  new  legal  framework  for  ownership  and  licensing  of 37 
 
intellectual property rights (patents) of the output of public-funded research. This is 
why a proposed legislation called The Protection and Utilisation of Publicly Funded 
Intellectual Property Bill 2008 has been tabled in the Indian parliament. 
 
This bill has been designed on the lines of the US Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. At present 
in India, public-funded research is carried out (in many cases with extramural funding 
from government agencies) without any express contract specifying ownership over 
the intellectual property generated. The forthcoming bill proposes to streamline IPR 
provisions  in  these  cases  by  allocating  patent  rights  to  universities  and  research 
institutions  (identified  as  ‘recipients’  in  the  bill)  over  inventions  arising  from 
government research grants. Disclosure norms appear to be strong given the fact that 
the recipients shall not be allowed to publicly disclose, publish or exhibit the public-
funded  intellectual  property  till  patent  applications  are  formally  made  in  India  or 
abroad.
16  If  the  recipient  university  or  institute  fails  to  do  so  within  a  stipulated 
period, the funding government agency will retain the rights to apply for a patent. The 
bill also allows exclusive licensing at the discretion of the patent holder to anyone 
who  manufactures  products  using  such  public-funded  intellectual  property  within 
India. 
 
The  principal  arguments  favouring  such  an  enactment  in  India  are  based  on 
expectations of an increase in industry interest in exploring commercially applicable, 
public-funded research output. The increase is expected to be driven by greater clarity 
on  who  owns  these  patents  and  who  to  negotiate  with.  The  exclusive  licensing 
provision  is  expected  to  incentivise  industry  to  come  forward  and  invest  in  the 
development of university-generated prototypes. Enthusiasts argue that the present 
bill, when made into law, will lead to greater university-industry collaborations by 
reducing the transaction costs of IPR negotiations. It is also believed that this bill 
would enhance the revenue prospects of an individual university through licensing of 
patented inventions. One can infer from these arguments that institutional intervention 
in this case is meant to rejuvenate the process of technology transfer from Indian 
universities and research institutes to industry. 
 
                                                 
16 http://rajyasabha.nic.in/legislative/amendbills/Science/protection_utlisation.pdf 38 
 
Against the backdrop of this proposed Indian legislation, we now attempt to draw 
concrete lessons for India from the critical review of the US experience presented 
earlier. The US evidence with regard to the acclaimed consequences of the Bayh-Dole 
Act  is  far  from  unambiguous.  Moreover,  the  expected  impact  of  a  similar  legal 
intervention in India will clearly depend on the context and environment, i.e. on the 
nature and culture, of public-funded research in India. Despite the absence of a clear 
understanding of the potential impact of such legislations, the way the Bayh-Dole 
legislation  has  been  emulated  in  many  of  the  developed  as  well  as  emerging 
economies has increased its appeal to policy makers. However, at the policy making 
level, at least in India, the original US Bayh-Dole Act, rather the variants adopted by 
other  countries,  remains  the  benchmark  to  be  cited  in  support  of  the  move  to 
implement this law in India. 
 
For deriving lessons for India, based on the conceptual-empirical synthesis of the US 
evidence, we pose three distinct sub-questions: 
 
a)  Why IPR legislation for public-funded research in India? 
b)  Why a Bayh-Dole for India? 
c)  Why at this juncture? 
 
VI.3.1  Why IPR Legislation for Public-funded research in India? 
 
It has often been felt that public-funded research in India needs to be re-energised. 
One  channel  is  through  a  legal  framework  protecting  intellectual  property  to 
incentivise public-funded research. This is essentially a re-assertion of the age-old 
conviction of the efficacy of the IPR system in creating innovation incentives in the 
framework of the so-called linear approach to innovation. This approach is based on 
the understanding that the promise of private appropriation of research results drives 
creativity and innovation. Interestingly, the opposite viewpoint is equally strong and it 
considers  knowledge  as  a  public  good  (non-rivalrous  and  non-excludable)  where 
market-based private incentives like IPR would lead to socially sub-optimal levels of 
knowledge  creation.  However,  even  from  the  perspective  of  individual  scientists, 
there is a pertinent debate on whether their motivation for research is ‘extrinsic’ or 39 
 
‘intrinsic’ in nature. If indeed scientists respond to extrinsic motivations, IPR would 
incentivise research. 
 
But is there any evidence to suggest that extrinsic motivations indeed dominate the 
pursuit of knowledge? According to Thursby and Thursby (2007), there may be little 
need for patents to provide academic scientists the appropriate incentives to invent or 
disclose, since the rewards associated with the norms of science itself encourage both 
invention and public disclosure. This is in perfect consonance with the prima facie 
impression about the mental frame of Indian academic scientists, who have never 
been quite concerned about patent ownership or financial incentives for their research 
pursuits. Hence, how far IPR legislation will help energise research in India remains a 
matter of debate. 
 
Apart  from  incentivising  public-funded  research  itself,  the  IPR  legislation  is  also 
expected to incentivise industry to come forward and pick up ideas and inventions 
(often embryonic) arising out of public-funded research by assuring them exclusive 
licensing rights of these ideas with a clear patent ownership title. In fact, this, perhaps, 
is the primary objective of such legislations. However, as already discussed,  public-
funded research in India has not succeeded much in contributing adequately to the 
process  of  technological  learning  and  catch  up  by  Indian  industry.  While  Indian 
industry is considered immature, myopic and risk averse, university research in India 
is allegedly too tangential to have direct commercial application. It, therefore, remains 
to be seen if industry would be incentivised to come forward and pick up novel ideas 
from university labs just because they are assured of IPR protection. 
 
Finally, it has been also been argued that an IPR law may result in better regulation of 
patenting activities at universities through a judicious auditing of patent disclosure, 
application and licensing. In fact, the draft of the Indian bill clearly spells out its 
intention to guide public-funded research organisations to establish a mechanism to 
promote the culture of innovation and public-funded intellectual property generation. 
In the US, although patenting of university research was viewed with some sort of 
ambivalence earlier, a major organisational change was the creation of TTOs in the 
wake of the US Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.  However, there is clear evidence to show 
that most of the TTOs in US universities spent more on their operations than they 40 
 
received as income from licensing and other activities. This raises serious doubts as to 
whether they have indeed been able to regulate university patenting and licensing 
activities  viably and judiciously. In  India,  so far, only the  top tier institutes have 
established  TTOs  and,  at  this  juncture,  one  cannot  envisage  making  them  self-
sustaining  through  successful  licensing  of  university  patents.  Indeed,  an  IPR 
legislation may result in establishing such TTOs indiscriminately across all public-
funded institutes and become another futile public-policy exercise, resulting in filing 
and maintaining a large number of unutilised government patents at the cost of the 
public exchequer! 
 
VI.3.2  Why a Bayh-Dole for India? 
 
The US Bayh Dole Act 1980 was perhaps the first uniform IP legislation that sought 
to assign IP rights to universities and institutions for all federally funded research. As 
discussed earlier, this was felt to be necessary at that juncture to save public-funded 
inventions from the clutches of the funding (and other government) agencies that held 
the  primary  stake.  This  unnecessarily  delayed  the  process  of  technology 
commercialisation.  These agencies  were  sometimes  obstructive.  The consequences 
were visible in terms of the minimal technology commercialisation that took place out 
of  federally  funded  research  and  the  US  losing  out  on  industrial  competitiveness 
during the 1970s. 
 
If we seek to replicate such a law in India, it becomes important to understand the 
preconditions that bind us to do the same thing here as well. The Bayh-Dole, by 
assigning clear IP rights in the hands of the universities/institutions, in a way wanted 
to  do  away  with  the  operational  hassle  that  existed  in  the  form  of  unwarranted 
tensions  between  funding  agencies  and  institutions  over  IP  ownership.  Such 
operational  bottlenecks  were  considered  the  most  crucial  barriers  to  technology 
commercialisation in the US. But, this is certainly not the case in India. Government 
funding agencies hardly stake their claims, perhaps with some exceptions in the case 
of funding by the Department of Biotechnology. In most cases, the CSIR retains the 
right to patent and license all research conducted at their laboratories. IITs, on the 
other hand, have both inventor as well as institution owned patens. Research in Indian 
academia has so far been known to promote flexibilities in research scope and modes 41 
 
of  dissemination.  Terms  and  conditions  from  government  funding  agencies  have 
never been perceived as a serious problem. Hence, the basic tenet of the arguments for 
introducing the Bayh-Dole Act in the US is not valid in the case of Indian public-
funded research. 
 
The  mode  of  licensing  also  has  implications  for  market  competition  in  product 
development. After the World War II, only non-exclusive licensing of public-funded 
research was allowed in the US to promote competition. However, faced with the 
competitiveness  crisis  of  the  1970s  and  the  large  pool  of  unutilised  government 
patents,  it  was  thought  that  non-exclusive  licensing  did  not  provide  adequate 
incentives to private industry to come forward and pick up university technologies for 
commercialisation. Therefore, the Bayh-Dole Act for the first time allowed exclusive 
licensing of federally funded research at the discretion of the institution. In India, 
licensing of public-funded research has always been a strategic decision on a case-by-
case basis. Generally, the option of exclusive licensing is practiced only in areas that 
run high risks during development and where the transaction costs associated with the 
transfer of technology is fairly high. As we have mentioned, Indian institutions and 
universities have taken steps (and some of them for quite sometime now) to put in 
place organisational structures to facilitate technology transfer. These have been done 
following models adopted by the West, particularly the US, as a matter of institutional 
policy and not because of any law. Thus, it is unclear why one needs a replication of 
the  Bayh-Dole  Act  in  India,  explicitly  accommodating  possibilities  of  exclusive 
licensing, when the provision for such licensing already exists. 
 
VI.3.3.  Why at this juncture in India? 
 
How could such a law help public-funded research in India now is a substantially 
nuanced  question.  Whether  the  law  achieves  its  objectives,  namely,  facilitating 
commercialisation of public-funded research output as well as ushering in creativity 
in public-funded research, depends crucially on the existing research culture in India 
and the way both academia and industry responds to such a legal intervention. When 
the Bayh-Dole was introduced, the US had already attained the highest standards of 
scientific research. The only aim now was to rejuvenate the process of technology 
transfer from public-funded research, which had slowed down during the 1970s. US 42 
 
industry was the world leader in generating cutting-edge technologies with frontier 
R&D effort. Many of them have been actively interfacing with the academic world 
through various modes and channels, including sponsored research and consultancy 
agreements. Hence, they were perhaps in a position to explore university patents for 
commercial development once an appropriate incentive structure was  put  in  place 
through legal intervention. 
 
Perhaps this is not quite the case in India today. On the academic front, India will 
have to take its scientific achievements to a higher level through greater creativity and 
innovation.  Science  in  India,  pursued  in  public-funded  research  institutions  since 
independence, has now received renewed focus through this impending bill. However, 
as already argued, whether such a law provides the right kind of incentives for science 
research and innovation per se is an open question. Apart from the state of academic 
research, industry in India is also perhaps not mature enough to engage in effective 
university-industry interface. Both have remained shy of each other for a long time. 
 
Although it is evident that university-industry technology transfer can actually happen 
through multiple channels, intellectual property protection in academic research has 
been in focus for quite sometime now, even in India. It is true that scientists in Indian 
universities have been patenting their research, albeit to a very limited extent, but the 
confusion regarding a possible conflict between publication and patenting, both in 
operational as well as in philosophical terms, still persists. In fact, ethical issues about 
IPRs in academic research connected to norms of “disinterestedness” of the academic 
profession have always been a common sentiment in Indian academia. This is not to 
suggest that such issues were fully resolved among the US academic community at 
the  time  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  was  introduced.  However,  perhaps  the  US  academic 
world was more attuned to the idea of patenting their research and far more aware of 
IPR  provisions,  compared  to  what  we  observe  among  Indian  academia  now. 
Therefore, the introduction of the law at this juncture may at best be a little pre-
mature. 
 
The other two issues that should possibly be taken into perspective are – first, the 
existence of a large pool of unutilised government patents already in India, something 
very  similar  to  the  situation  in  the  US  before  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  but  with  very 43 
 
different implications, and the second, the heterogeneity in the quality of academic 
research across the spectrum of public funded institutions in India. 
 
The CSIR, which is the largest repository of government held patents in India, is a 
prime example of an institution with a large number of unutilised patents. To the best 
of our knowledge, the structure of patent ownership and the licensing clauses in this 
set up are very similar in spirit to that being proposed by the new Indian legislation. 
Indeed,  the  CSIR  holds  the  right  to  patent  all  public-funded  research  output  and 
license  them  exclusively.  Therefore,  any  bottleneck  in  the  process  of 
commercialisation of unutilised patents cannot be directly linked to IP ownership per 
se. 
 
The last issue is that of the heterogeneity in the quality of academic research across 
the  spectrum  of  public-funded  institutions  in  India.  Universities,  institutes  and 
laboratories, which are the pillars of public-funded research in India, do not uniformly 
perform in terms of the quality of research or human resource generation. Only a 
handful  of  premier  institutes  and  universities  can  compare  themselves  with 
international  standards.  Such  skewed  research  performance  may  be  linked  to  the 
concentration of good minds in the top tier institutions only. Therefore, it remains to 
be seen how a uniform IP law can be tailored to suit every tier of the quality spectrum 
in India, if at all. Different constituencies are expected to respond differently to a new 
institutional framework triggered by a new law. It is here that one fears that a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach could prove to be counter productive. 
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In  this  paper,  we have  reviewed the  economics literature on the implications  and 
consequences of institutionalising intellectual property rights in academic research. In 
the USA, the culture of patenting in universities and institutions existed for a long 
time. However, it was only in the 1970s that US policy makers felt the need for a 
legislative  intervention  to  promote  university  patenting  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
transfer of technologies generated out of federally funded research at universities. 
This led to the introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which assigned patent 
ownership to universities for all publicly funded research outcomes. 44 
 
Today,  nearly  three  decades  after  this  legislation,  we  are  still  unsure  about  its 
consequences and implications. Of course, there was a spurt in university patenting in 
the  US  after  the  Bayh  Dole  Act,  but  there  has  not  been  a  commensurate  rise  in 
licensing of federally funded university patents. Moreover, there is ambiguity as to 
whether there has been a fall in the general ‘quality’ of university patents after Bayh-
Dole,  their  rising  numbers  notwithstanding.  Another  issue  that  has  received 
considerable research attention pertains to the culture and focus of a university being 
shaped by the financial incentives embedded in IPR. The US evidence allays fears of 
any  permanent  shift  in  research  focus  of  universities  away  from  basic  research, 
although  biomedical  and  other  applied  research  fields  emerged  in  the  research 
portfolio in a big way. The US literature also fails to confirm that financial incentives 
drive  academic scientists in  any  major  way.  Nevertheless, studies  do suggest that 
excessive  emphasis  on  patenting  as  the  only  (or  a  major)  channel  of  technology 
transfer might blinker our vision and lead us to ignore other very important channels 
of effective university-industry interface. 
 
Later, from the latter half of the 1990s, many OECD countries (including France, 
Denmark and Japan) along with several emerging economies (like Brazil, China and 
South  Africa)  have  enacted  Bayh-Dole  type  legislations  to  promote  university-
industry interface and technology transfer. However, there is little by way of concrete 
empirical evidence from these countries of the consequences of such legislations. 
 
At present, India is also contemplating a similar legislation to stimulate public-funded 
research for greater industrial application. The landscape of public-funded research in 
India is vast and impressive, although diverse and heterogeneous and its contribution 
to  society  has  remained  far  below  its  potential.  It  is  expected  that  public-funded 
research in India will be energised for more effective technology transfer through 
streamlining  the  IPR  provisions.  It  is  in  this  context  that  the  proposed  Indian 
legislation is discussed against the backdrop of the conceptual empirical synthesis of 
US literature on Bayh-Dole to draw lessons for India. We argue that an IPR law will 
perhaps not act as a magic formula to achieve the intended goals of rejuvenating 
India’s public-funded research and encourage greater industry applications. 
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Of course, we have seen how universities in the West have assumed new roles in the 
innovation process by codifying knowledge through patenting and licensing of their 
research, by actively supporting the creation and development of spin-offs and by 
engaging in contract research and joint ventures. They tried out various operational 
business  models  to  encourage  university  scientists  to  become  entrepreneurs  with 
equity share holding in spin-offs. This worked very well in some cases – the Silicon 
Valley  around  Stanford  University  and  the  Route  128  around  MIT  are  two 
prominently successful examples of this attempt. However, if we try to replicate these 
models in Indian universities simply by institutionalising IPRs for academic research, 
ignoring the realities of the differences in context, environment, culture and levels of 
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